We examine the factors associated with the establishment of an environmental committee at the board level and its impact on the disclosure of environmental risks in an Australian context. Using a sample of Australian Stock Exchange firms disclosing their information to the Carbon Disclosure Project, we document a strong association between the existence of environmental committee and board independence, CEO duality, directors' share ownership, and institutional shareholding. Firms that belong to environmentally sensitive industries are more likely to have environmental committees. Furthermore, we find that firms with environmental committees are more likely to disclose environmental risk information and this leads to mitigation in information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders.
INTRODUCTION
Institutional investors and other stakeholders of firms are demanding additional transparent climate change risks disclosure information. (Griffin & Sun 2013) . Kim and Lyon (2011) postulate that climate change has direct and indirect financial impact on firm value. Changes in weather pattern and rises in sea levels create direct financial risks to the firms. Extreme weather around the world related to climate change is moving up the boardroom agenda. Many firms see climate change related risks are real and present danger (CDP 2012) . Therefore, corporate directors will need to think differently to address climate change issues. Recent work by Peters and Romi (2013) suggests that the existence of environmental committee at board level is an effective tool to address climate change related issues. The existence of environmental committee at the board level encourages a firm to address the climate related issues, and evaluate and report quality and credible environmental information to the public (Rankin, Windsor & Wahyuni 2011) . Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) argue that the establishment of CSR committee at the board level is important for a firm to address environmental issue.
The establishment of environmental committee is not mandatory in most countries but have been shown to be beneficial (Peters and Romi, 2013) . It is a voluntary governance mechanism that could potentially mitigate climate risks by providing greater levels of disclosure relating to climate risk. Rodrigue et al .(2013) provide evidence consistent with the view that environmentally sensitive firms in the US pursue environmental governance mechanisms principally as a symbolic approach to manage stakeholder perceptions on environmental management with little substantial effect on actual environmental performance.
In this paper, using an Australian sample of 550 firm-years, we examine the role of voluntary governance mechanisms on environmental performance. Our primary focus is on the employment of environmental committee to manage disclosure relating to greenhouse gas emissions. The objectives of this research are two-fold. The first objective is to identify internal corporate governance variables which influence to create an environmental committee at board level. The second objective is to assess the impact of presence of an environmental committee on environmental risk disclosure transparency and information asymmetry. This study embraces agency theory, signalling theory, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy theory to examine the internal corporate governance factors that influence to develop an environmental committee on the board of directors. This study further analyses the impact of having an environmental committee.
Using a sample of 550 firm-years (from CDP reporting year 2006 to 2009), we find that stronger internal corporate governance variables have a strong support to form an environmental committee on the board of directors and firms with an environmental committee are more likely to disclose transparent environmental risks information which leads to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders. Our study contributes to the literature about the impact of internal corporate governance variables on formation of environmental committee and its impact on environmental risks disclosure transparency and information asymmetry. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of literature and develop empirically testable hypotheses. This is followed by the data and methodology in section 3. We report the empirical results in section 4 and discuss the implications of the research findings. In the final section, we offer our concluding remarks.
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Internal corporate governance mechanism plays an important role to mitigate agency problem and requires managers to disclose information (Irani & Oesch 2013) . Internal corporate governance factors of a firm that impact on voluntary formation of an environmental committee and environmental risk disclosure transparency has been analysed from theoretical and empirical perspectives. A number of theories consider different arguments in order to explain the relationships. Main research question of this research paper is that which corporate governance attributes influence the formation of an environmental committee and how does this influence the level of environmental risk disclosure transparency and therefore lower the information asymmetry?
Prior researches mostly concentrate on the association between the existence of environmental committee and the level of environmental disclosures. The existence of environmental committee at the board level encourages addressing the climate related issues, and evaluating and reporting quality and credible GHG information to the public (Peters & Romi 2012; Rankin, Windsor & Wahyuni 2011; Rupley, Brown & Marshall 2012 ). Peters and Romi (2012) find a positive association between the existence of an environmental committee probability and quality of GHG emission disclosure. On the other hand, Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) and Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) find no association between the presence of an environmental committee and voluntary GHG emission disclosure. Peters and Romi (2012) argue that the presence of environmental committee is purely voluntary and indicates a firm's committement to the firm's environmental issues and transparency. They further argue that environmental committee will take more proactive interest in a firm's sustainablilty strategies. Berthelot and Robert (2011) argue that establishment of an environmental committee is necessary when firms where climate change risk may be significant. Therefore, the board of directors should have an environmental committee at the board level to oversee the environmental related concerns. They examine the presence of environmental committee within the board of directors and environmental disclosure in Canadian oil and gas firms. They find that the environmental disclosure is very low. However, when the firms have an environmental committee within the board of directors the level of disclosure is higher. Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) argue that the existence of an environmental committee at board level provide information to a firm's stakeholders related to greenhouse gas emissions. The committee can address the risks associated with increased regulations and firm's operations related to climate change.
To examine the factors of internal corporate governance determinants to develop an environmental committee and its impact on quality of environmental risks disclosure and information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders, we incorporate four theories.
Firstly, agency theory deals with agency relationship between shareholders and managers.
Managers of firms may have more private information than shareholders. Agency theory is concerned with resolving agency relationship problem by showing some short of firm's activities. Formation of an environmental committee plays as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems by providing more transparent environmental risks information to reduce information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders. Therefore, firms with an environmental committee are more likely to adopt assurance of corporate sustainability reports to mitigate information asymmetry and provide quality more information (Peters & Romi 2013 The role of board of directors is mitigating the agency problem by providing more transparent information on behalf of shareholders. Inside directors on the board provide firm specific information while outside directors provide resources to deal with uncertainty (Fama & Jensen 1983 ). More independent directors on the board are expected to deal with uncertainty of firms so that they are willing to have an environmental committee to address climate change related risk and opportunities. Therefore, we expect there is a positive association between the existence of an environmental committee and proportion of independent directors on the board of directors. Our first hypothesis is:
H1
The existence of an environmental committee is significantly and positively associated with the proportion of independent directors on the board.
Agency theory argues that the dual positions of chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Managing Director should be separated. In Australia, the Corporate Governance Council of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) has set guidelines for the CEO duality. It recommends that the roles of chairman and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the same individual (Recommendation 2.3). Firms with good internal corporate governance strengthens internal control of firms and discipline managers for their opportunistic behaviour (Hazarika, Karpoff & Nahata 2012 ).
H2
The existence of an environmental committee is significantly and negatively associated with when the chairman of the board also holds CEO positions.
A larger numbers of directors on the board have diverse skills and knowledge so that they can provide more resources to establish additional board sub-committee to oversee the matters (Subramaniam, McManus & Zhang 2009 ). They find a positive association between the existence of risk management committee and board size. The ASX the Corporate Governance
Council recommends that the board should be larger enough to incorporate a variety of perspective and skills, and to represent the best interest of the company as a whole rather than of individual shareholders or interest groups. From the above argument, we hypotheses
H3
The existence of an environmental committee is significantly and positively associated with board size.
Webb (2004) argues that firms with female directors on the board will disclose more information. Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) finds that socially responsible firms are more likely have female directors on the board than non-socially responsible firms.
Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye (2012) find that increasing presence on the nomination committee of female is likely having a positive impact on the level of board gender diversity.
H4
The existence of an environmental committee is significantly and positively associated with board diversity.
Managerial ownership refers to shares owned by all directors on the board. Directors have higher proportion of shareholding in a firm, less likely to form an environmental committee.
It is argued that directors with higher proportion of shareholding have less incentive to form an environmental committee due to principal-agent relationship. 
H5
The existence of an environmental committee is significantly and negatively associated with managerial share ownership. practices. It is argued that the higher the level of substantial shareholding, the more likely a firm will form an environmental committee. This argument leads to the following hypothesis.
H6
The existence of an environmental committee is significantly and negatively associated with substantial shareholding.
Audit committee size and its frequency of meetings are more likely to have an incentive to establish an environmental committee on the board level. Audit committee members mostly focus on quality and credible financial information reporting. They have incentives to form another board sub-committee to oversee the climate change related issues. Therefore, we expect the audit committee size and its meeting frequencies have an impact on forming an environmental committee.
H7
The existence of an environmental committee is significantly and positively associated with audit committee size and its number of meetings.
The main purposes of have an environmental committee at board level are addressing climate change risks, disclosing higher information in relation to climate change, and lowering information asymmetry among stakeholders. Peters and Romi (2012) argue that presence of an environmental committee address firm's environmental risk and will be more likely to respond to stakeholder demands of disclosures related to GHG emission information. They find that the presence of environmental committee is positively associated with the likelihood of GHG emission disclosure. Walls, Berrone and Phan (2012) find that having an environmental committee on the board exists when firms have either environmental strengths or concerns. They suggest that the board of directors can provide necessary resources to form an environmental committee to strengthen environmental performance or help to mitigate environmental issues. Rodrigue, Magnan and Cho (2013) argue that voluntary formation of environmental committee not only monitor management in terms of their environmental actions but also perform an effective way to provide advice to management when dealing with environmental issues. They find that presence of an environmental committee plays as a symbolic role to manage stakeholder perceptions rather than proactive role to mitigate environmental performance. Aggarwal and Dow (2012) suggest that climate change influences risks and opportunities for firms and in responding institutional investors' demand firms will disclose more transparent climate change risk information to assess their investments.
H8
Firm with an environmental committee is more likely to have greater levels of environmental risk disclosure transparency and lower levels of information asymmetry. Corwin and Schultz (2012) propose a bid-ask spread from daily high and low prices of the stocks. The basic idea is that a logarithm ratio between daily high and low price is separated into variance of the stock and bid-ask spread (Butt 2013). The estimator proceeds by calculating an estimate of daily bid-ask spreads as a function of the high-low ratio for single two day period and the high-low rations for two consecutive single days (Dettenrieder & Theissen 2012) . The estimator is defined as
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Where H t and L t are the high and low prices for t respectively and H t,t+1 and L t,t+1 are the high and low prices for two-day consisting of days t and t+1.
We incorporate regression analysis to investigate the determinants of board compositions and ownership structure on the existence of environmental committees. We use the following models to test the hypothesis concerning the relationship between the existence of environmental committee and internal corporate governance variables. 
Variable Definitions

Presence of environmental committee (ENV)
The existence of environmental committee which is a dummy variable takes 1 if there is an environmental committee at board level. Title of an environmental committee includes in this study Sustainability committee, occupational health, safety and environmental committee and social responsibility committee.
Environmental risks disclosure transparency (ERK)
Physical, regulatory, and other risks related to climate change may present significant risks to a firm. Environmental risks disclosure transparency is a total score of physical, regulatory, and other risks disclosure information. We measure environmental risks disclosure transparency using companies' annual reports, sustainability reports and website with the LEV is calculated a sum of long-term debt and short-term debt to total assets. ROA is a profitability ratio that calculated net profit after tax divided by total assets. LTA is a size of a firm that measured by logarithm of total assets. The mean and median of environmental risks disclosure transparency score (ERK) for full sample is 58.10% and 58.06% respectively. The subsample results show that firms with an environmental committee disclose more transparent environmental risks information than firms without an environmental committee. The average HL Spread for full sample as we as the subsamples of firms with and without an environmental committee are 4.55%, 3.99% and 4.73% respectively and different is only significant at the 10% level. Table 3 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation results among internal corporate governance variables, environmental risks disclosure transparency, HL Spread and firms characteristics. The existence of environmental committee is positively significantly correlated with the proportion of independent directors on the board, female directors on the board, greenhouse gas intensive industry, and size of firms. On the other hand, CEO duality, directors' share ownership, and substantial shareholding are negatively at the same time significantly associated with the existence of environmental committee. Leverage is negatively correlated with the formation of environmental committee but significance is at the 5% level. There is no association between the existence of environmental committee and board size, institutional investors, frequency of audit committee meetings, members of audit committee, and return on assets. Support of H1 indicates that more independent directors on the board are like to reduce agency cost and provided enough resources to establish an environmental committee at the board level. This result is a significant and positive association between board independence and the existence of environmental committee, which supports to agency theory as well as stakeholder theory.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Correlation matrix
CEO duality is negatively associated with the existence of an environmental committee. CEO acts as chairman on the board is less likely to have an environmental committee which lead to agency problem. Gender diversity tries to reduce agency costs. All directors on the board with higher proportion of shareholding are not willing to establish environmental committees.
They are not ready to provide more resources to form an environmental committee which lead to bear more agency costs by Australian firms. On the other hand, institutional investors with more share ownership induce to form an environmental committee. The environmental intensive firms are trying to create public image through supporting legitimacy theory.
In this section we provide the evidence supporting the impact of having an environmental committee. Firms with an environmental committee are more likely to disclose more transparent environmental risks disclosure to the public. Peters and Romi (2013) find that presence of an environmental committee is positively associated with sustainability assurance. When a firm forms an environmental committee on the board of directors and that environmental committee ensures more quality environmental risks information disclosure to the stakeholders. This firm appears to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders. Firms are grouped into an environmental intensive industry that more likely to form an environmental committee and disclose more transparent environmental risks information.
Robustness analysis
This section provides robustness analysis. We examine the relationship between presence of environmental committee on the board and transparency of environmental risk disclosure by incorporating correction for self-selection bias. We estimate the following equations to investigate the environmental disclosure transparency and presence of environmental committee. We estimate Heckman (1976) two-stage model to correct self-selection bias.
We examine the relationship between high and low spread and environmental risk disclosure by including correction for self-selection bias. We estimate the following equation to investigate information asymmetry and environmental disclosure transparency. Table 6 and 7 reveal that the most of the first stage variable are predicted sign and are statistically significant. In the second stage, to control for potential selection bias LAMBDA is included in this model and our results are consistent with the ordinary least square method which are reported in Table 5 .
CONCLUSIONS
Using agency, signalling, stakeholder and legitimacy theories, we examine the determinants of the establishment of an environmental committee at the board level. Our empirical tests Firms with an environmental committee are more likely to disclose environmental risks in a transparent manner to the public. Our evidence is consistent with the findings of Peters and Romi (2013) who find that presence of an environmental committee is positively associated with sustainability assurance. When a firm forms an environmental committee as part of its board structure, it ensures a higher quality of disclosure of environmental risks to its stakeholders. The higher disclosure relating to environmental risks appears to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders. The role of the standing committees at board levels meet frequently and report to the board of director regarding their committee performance to perform its roles effectively. The
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations of Australian
Stock Exchange, ASX (2007) All companies that answer "Yes" at 1.1 will be asked 1.6
1.6 Describe any actions the company has taken or plans to take to manage or adapt to the risks that have been identified, including the cost of those actions.
3 Scale. Table 1 This table reports internal corporate governance variables, environmental risks information transparency, and high and low prices spread and firms characteristics for the full sample as well as two subsamples of firms with and without an environmental committee. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the board. DUA is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board. BSZ is the number of directors on the board. FEM is a dummy variable equal to one when female director/s on the board. MSO is the percentage of shareholding by all directors on the board; SUB is the substantial shareholding extracted from substantial shareholding list. INS is the institutional shareholding calculated from Top20 shareholding excluding individuals. AMT is the frequency of audit committee meetings in a financial year. EXP is highly environmental sensitive industries that assigned one if a firm belongs to energy or material or utilities industry classifications. LEV is the debt ratio calculated total debt divided by total assets. ROA is the reported net profit after tax divided by total assets. LTA is the logarithm of total assets. ERK is environmental risks measured a sum of regulatory, physical, and other risks with regards to climate change of a firm's operations. HL spread is average of the high-low estimates across all overlapping two day periods after announcement of 9 months???? Table 3 present Pearson correlations between environmental committee, internal corporate governance variables and firms characteristics. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the board. DUA is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board. BSZ is the number of directors on the board. FEM is a dummy variable equal to one when female director/s on the board. MSO is the percentage of shareholding by all directors on the board; SUB is the substantial shareholding extracted from substantial shareholding list. INS is the institutional shareholding calculated from Top20 shareholding excluding individuals. AMT is the frequency of audit committee meetings in a financial year. MAC is the number of members in an audit committee. EXP is highly environmental sensitive industries that assigned one if a firm belongs to energy or material or utilities industry classifications. LEV is the debt ratio calculated total debt divided by total assets. ROA is the reported net profit after tax divided by total assets. LTA is the logarithm of total assets. *** Correlation is significant at 1% level. ** Correlation is significant at 5% level. *** Correlation is significant at 10% level. 
